The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Three Principles of Strategic Replicators
Kevin Vallier
cs.GT
Dec 5, 2025 · v5
cs.AI cs.CY cs.MA econ.TH
TL;DR
The framework's results, a market-rent-entry ancestry bridge plus seven 'laws', are formalized in Lean 4 with Mathlib: 240 theorems, no custom axioms, public repository.
Abstract
Strategic replicators combine evaluated choice and reproductive transmission. An agent chooses among alternatives; the consequences of those choices influence continuation or reproduction; and successors receive organization that shapes later choices. Artificial intelligence makes this combination salient when agents have authority to create, configure, or retire software instances. This paper organizes the general logic around three principles: situated choice, reproductive transmission, and institution-mediated coupling. The principles are constitutive rather than predictions of growth or improvement. A common representation distinguishes carriers, inherited records, decision owners, and the mechanisms that allocate consequences. Actual parent-descendant attribution yields a selection-transmission identity. Separate compatibility results characterize when utility-maximizing choices also maximize a reproductive criterion. Gode and Sunder's zero-intelligence traders reveal the role of institutions: enforced properties can hold across different decision procedures, while aggregate efficiency alone determines neither individual gains nor descent. A worked market-rent-entry model connects institutional profits to actual offspring, with its occurrence-level ancestry bridge checked in Lean. A direct-deployment example then shows evaluated preferences undergoing selection without presupposing that every chooser values reproduction. Formal appendices develop games with endogenous players, deployment-induced tipping, endogenous electorates, and the production of institutions, with models, proofs, and examples. The paper and its supporting formal artifacts are a prototype kernel with a generative function: an instrument for constructing models of strategic replication. The results are formal; their application to deployed populations and their empirical implications remain to be tested.
Problem
Strategic replicators are agents whose evaluated choices also shape their own reproduction, such as AI systems that can spawn or retire software instances. Neither classical game theory nor evolutionary dynamics covers this setting.
Approach
The paper organizes the theory around three principles: situated choice, reproductive transmission, and institution-mediated coupling. It builds on the RUPSI axioms, which yield Games with Endogenous Players, and on replicator-type dynamics over lineage types measured by return on compute. It develops results including a Price decomposition, ESDI characterization (Nash, KKT and LP equivalence), and N-level stability via spectral radius. The results are mechanized in Lean 4 with Mathlib, with a theorem-by-theorem contract and an axiom audit.
Results
The Lean development has 240 theorems, 141 of them audited headline results. It compiles cold from a clean checkout using only propext, Classical.choice and Quot.sound, with no sorry, admit or native_decide. The empirical implications remain untested.